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ABSTRACT
According to the Verizon 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report , 321 POS terminals (user devices)
were involved in data breaches in 2017 [1]. These data breaches involved standalone POS terminals
as well as associated controller systems. This paper examines a standalone Point-of-Sale (POS)
system commonly used in smaller retail stores and restaurants to extract unencrypted data and
identify possible violations of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)
requirement to protect stored cardholder data. Persistent storage (flash memory chips) were
removed from the devices and their contents were successfully acquired. Information about the
device and the code running on it was successfully extracted, although no PCI DSS data storage
violations were identified.
Keywords: POS device, PCI DSS, compliance, data extraction, chip-off

1. INTRODUCTION
Data breaches involving Point-of-Sale (POS)
devices are becoming commonplace.
These
breaches are happening in many industries, and
no industry seems to be immune [16] . A short
list of recent POS breaches would include
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restaurants (Applebee's, Arby's, Sonic, Chili's,
Zippys', Subway, etc.), health care facilities
(Oregon clinic), hospitality facilities (Holiday
Inn, Hyatt), and various retail stores (Forever
21 , Target [12], Home Depot , etc.). Even POS
vendors, payment system and service providers
such as Harbortouch, DataPoint POS , and
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Heartland Payment Systems [11], are not
immune [l].
Many POS systems consists of a workstation
or server (controller) running a mainstream
operating system and a POS terminal or device
that reads the card. In such systems, the
controller executes the processing and
communication tasks. Other POS systems
consist only of a POS device or terminal, which
has the capability to store and process some
subset of the card and transaction data, and the
device or terminal also communicates with a
remote system to execute the transaction. Past
breaches have involved the standalone POS
terminals or devices, while other breaches have
involved an accompanying POS controller or
server, which are often running an MS Windows
operating system [8] . Past breaches have been
attributed to a lack of security on the victim's
POS terminal, POS controller, and/ or the data
network on which the POS systems reside and
over which they communicate.
This paper presents a forensic first look at a
common POS device found in smaller retail and
restaurant
establishments, specifically
a
VeriFone device deployed under the Verizon
brand. These particular devices were selected for
their widespread adoption in small and mediumsized business more likely to have weak security
programs [9], their standalone design which
implies unprotected sensitive data will be on
these devices instead of a separate controller,
and their ready availability on the resale
market. These devices were examined to
identify plaintext operational information with
security implications and to determine whether
they violated the data storage requirement of
the PCI DSS standard. An "Existing
Data/ Specimens" form was filed with one of the
author's Institutional Review Boards (IRB) for
human subjects research in the event that PII
was found or is found in the future, although
none has been found to date in this work.

@ 2019 ADFSL

CDFSL Proceedings 2019

2. INTRODUCTION TO
PCIDSS
"PCI DSS is the global data security standard
adopted by the payment card brands for all
entities that process, store or transmit
cardholder data and/ or sensitive authentication
data. It consists of steps that mirror security
best practices" [6]. The main goal of PCI DSS
is to protect cardholder data using the PCI
security standards. These standards "apply to
all entities that store, process, and/ or transmit
cardholder data. It covers technical and
operational system components included in or
connected to cardholder data" [6].
PCI DSS requirement 3 concerns protecting
stored cardholder data. "Cardholder data refers
to any information printed, processed,
transmitted or stored in any form on a payment
card" [6] .
Guidelines
include:

•
•

•

•
•
•

to

protect

cardholder

data

Store data only as long as necessary for
business
Sensitive authentication data should not
be stored after authorization (even if it
is encrypted)
Only display either the first six or last
four digits of the primary account
number (PAN).
Encrypt the PAN when stored
Clearly document procedures to protect
encryption keys
Implement procedures to protect
encryption keys

Specific guidelines on how to protect the
data are in Appendix 2.
Storage of certain data elements on a
payment card is permitted, for example the
PAN can be stored with no encryption. The
cardholder name, service code, and expiration
date can be stored but must be encrypted (in
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the Target case, such data was encrypted, but
not immediately [131). The full track data (the
data on the magnetic stripe), the 3-4 digit
verification value (CAV, CVC, CVV, or CID),
and the PIN cannot be stored in any form.
Storage guidelines for cardholder data elements
are in Table 2 [6].

3. THEORETICAL
JUSTIFICATION
Point of sale devices, and embedded systems in
general, consist of four common functional
components:
persistent
storage,
volatile
memory, a processor, and communications
elements. Persistent storage contains the device
firmware (bootloader and operating system),
configuration data, and possibly other data
written during the course of operation. Volatile
memory (RAM) and processor contents are
interesting only for a running system [10,14,15],
and communication elements are interesting for
the data t hey transmit on a live system as well
as possible access vectors. We are specifically
interested in residual and security relevant data
available on a dead system, so we focused on
persistent storage. In the case of the POS
systems we examined, this persistent storage is
made up of a ROM chip containing a bootloader
and a flash memory chip soldered to one of the
device's printed circuit boards.
The flash memory on an embedded device
like a POS system will contain operating system
and related executable code, typically in
compiled form. Configuration information,
possibly including user account information, will
also be stored m
persistent storage.
Additionally, the running system may write
transaction or other data to t he flash memory.
The contents of the flash memory may be
encrypted in whole or in part using on-chip
encryption or off-chip encryption implemented
in hardware or software. Our goal in this work
is to extract the raw contents of the flash
memory and determine the data that can be
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extracted and the possible security implications
of access to that data.

4. MOTIVATION
Recently one of the authors visited a restaurant
and paid with a credit card. The POS device
was quite small and was the type t hat contacts
the payment system provider directly via a
telephone call. The call did not succeed, and
after a few seconds the POS device printed two
receipts. This worried the author somewhat was his payment information (name, credit card
information, transaction information) still on
the POS device, and if so, how long would it
remain there until it was processed?
The author noted the make and model of the
POS device and contacted the payment system
provider
(Heartland
Payment
Systems).
Heartland provided no help, except to state that
they only provide the credit card charging
system, and that any other information would
have to come from Verizon.
A call was made to Verizon customer
support for VeriFone devices. During this call
the author learned that the transaction
information is only on the POS device until
processed, and the unprocessed transactions are
cached until batch processing can be done later
in the day. They did not provide details on
when the batch processing would occur as it can
be done manually or automatically (daily time
set by the device operator). When the batch
process is finished , the transaction information
is deleted.
This information caused the author concern:
what if the POS device was stolen before the
batch processing is performed, and is the
transaction information securely deleted?

5. DEVICE ACQUISITION
One of the authors bought 3 used POS devices
via craigslist. All were of the Verizon brand and
were Verifone models; one was an Omni Vx570
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model and two were Omni Vx610 models.
These devices are the same type that the author
had observed in his restaurant incident. The
two Vx610 devices were owned by a catering
company (food truck) whose owner said they
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only connected to process transactions in the
evening. The Vx570 model was owned by a
bakery. One of the V erifone V x610 models used
for this examination is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Verifone Vx610 POS device

6. DATA EXTRACTION
This section will detail the data extraction
efforts. The first attempt included printing
data, followed by a Joint Test Action Group
(JTAG) access attempt and a chip-off
extraction.

6.1 Initial extraction
It was decided to power up one device and see
if any data could be extracted from it. The data
extraction began with powering on the Vx570
device and printing the last transaction. The
printout began with a summary / detail report
of transactions, which included the device
owner's name, address, and phone number,
followed by the information on the last batch
processed (date, time, batch# , terminal ID, list
of transactions, their dollar amount, and total).
This was followed by two printouts of the last
transaction (customer copy and merchant
copy), which included:

•
•

Device owner,
number
Terminal ID #
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address

and

phone

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Transaction date & time
Credit card type & last 4 digits of credit
card number
Transaction amount
Credit card owner name
Transaction approved/ not approved
Batch #
Authorization number

These transaction copies were followed
again by a summary and detail report of
transactions as shown in Figure 2.
The Vx570 device was briefly disassembled
and reassembled to get a quick look at the
motherboard. After reassembly, the device was
turned on and immediately displayed an error
message on the screen: "Security Alarm,
Tampering Detected [20000] Please reboot".
This message is known to be triggered by
physical disassembly of the device case.
Additionally, on one of the Vx610 devices a
Verix Multi-Application Conductor (VMAC)
Summary Report was printed, which contained
information about the terminal: the OS version,
the terminal type, the terminal serial number,
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RAM, FLASH memory, and GID information
(see VMAC Summary Report in Figure 3).
We also printed a VMAC Detail Report ,
which included a VMAC Summary Report,
followed by Group Details for each application
group (see partial VMAC Detail Report in
Figure 4).
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and Ethernet ports, but the computer did not
recognize that a device was connected. A wifi
connection attempt also failed. This confirmed
the entries on the VMAC detail report, which
stated that Wifi and Ethernet were not
supported on this terminal and the USB port
was disabled.

After these two reports were printed, the
device was connected to a computer via its USB
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Partial VMAC Detail Report

6.2 Digital extraction - Joint Test
Action Group (JTAG)
JT AG forensics is an advanced level data
acquisition method which involves connecting to
Test Access Ports (TAPs) on a device and
instructing the processor to transfer the raw
data stored on connected memory chips. When
supported, JT AG is an extremely effective
technique to extract a full physical image from
devices that cannot be acquired with normal
tools [2].
We attempted to conduct a JTAG
examination but were unsuccessful. This was
due to the test access ports being either not
enabled on t he board or not supported on by
JT AG equipment and configuration.

6.3 Chip-off data. extraction
The VeriFone XV610 devices were disassembled
to expose the printed circuit board assemblies.
The Printed Circuit Board Assemblies (PCBA)
were inspected to identify non-volatile flash
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memory components capable of data storage.
For each POS device, a single Spansion flash
memory chip model (S29)GL032N90FFI02 was
located upon removal of the PCBA
electromagnetic shielding.
Research was completed to determine the
Spansion GL032N90FFI02 particulars. The
manufacturer technical datasheet for the
S29GL-N family of devices was obtained from
www.alldatasheet.com and reviewed. This
revealed that the target chip is a NOR based
flash memory component with a storage
capacity of 4 megabytes. Specifically, the
component is a 32-Mb device organized as
2,097 ,152 words or 4,194,304 bytes with a 16-bit
wide data bus. While the part is available in
multiple chip packages, our target component
was determined to be the 64-ball fortified BGA
(ball grid array) package option (Figure 5).
The UP&UP UP-828P chip programmer
control software was then checked to confirm
read/ imaging support for the target part. The
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UP-828P did show explicit support for the
GL032N90FFI02 and the necessary EBGA64P
chip adapter was available. The control software
was further checked to verify that the indicated
part organization and capacity matched the
values detailed in the chip datasheet. The
control software presented the chip organization
as "200000h x 16-bit" which corresponds to the
4,194,304 bytes and 16-bit data bus as detailed
in the datasheet .
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The devices each had a 4MB flash memory
chip (Figure 6) , and the extraction effort
supplied both raw chip-off images as well as a
copy where the byte order was reversed
(RBO2). Data was extracted from both Vx610
devices.

Figure 5. Vx610 Motherboard

With imaging support verified , the chip-off
acquisitions were performed. There was no
visible chip underfill or coating, so no adhesive
removal was necessary. The GL032N90FFI02
chips were removed using a Zephyrtronics ZT-7
hot air reflow unit per the following steps:

•
•

•
•
•
•

The PCBA was mounted to the work
cradle
The PCBA was preheated using a
Zephyrtronics
Air Bath
digital
preheating unit @ 205°C
RMA-223 flux paste was applied around
and under the target chip
The ZT-7 reflow unit nozzle was
positioned over the target chip
The ZT-7 reflow unit was engaged to
ramp to a setpoint of 285°C
The ZT-7 vacuum probe was activated
for automatic chip removal
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Figure 6. Flash Memory Chip

The target chips automatically lifted when
the ZT-7 reflow unit nozzle temperature reached
approximately 280°C. After cooling, the
removed chips were cleaned using 99% isopropyl
alcohol in an ultrasonic cleaner. Once clean , the
chips were inspected for the presence of solder
bridges, excess or insufficient solder amounts on
each pad, and any other areas in need of
correction. No corrections were required for the
target chips.
Each target chip was imaged using an
UP &UP UP-828P universal chip programmer
per the following steps:

•

•
•

An EBGA64P chip package adapter was
attached to the UP-828P programmer
unit
The UP-828P control software version
2.0.4.8 was launched
The control software was configured to
read the target chip by selecting the
S29GL032N90FFI02 chip profile
Page 7
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The READ function was used to
download the chip data into the control
software buffer
The VERIFY function was used to reread the chip data and compare it to the
buffer contents
The verified chip data was saved to a
binary image file

as card type, transaction amount , cardholder's
name , last 4 digits of card number , etc.) in
either image file .

The Spansion GL032N90FFI02 chips were
successfully imaged with no errors and the
verification process yielded identical data. At
4,194,304 bytes, the file sizes of the saved binary
images matched the expected size as detailed in
the chip manufacturer datasheet. This confirms
that we acquired true and accurate forensic
grade copies of each chip's data.

Extracted data indicates that both units ran
the Verix v Operating System on 68k processors
(Motorola 68000; 32-bit CISC). The kernel is
located in bytes 0-65535 (64 KB); this is the first
128 sectors assuming a 512-bytes sector size.
Differences in these first 128 sectors began at
byte offset 827 and continued at byte offsets as
noted in the partial list below:

The chip-off procedure and imaging was
completed in accordance with accepted digital
forensic industry standards and practices. MD5,
SHAl, and SHA256 cryptographic hash values
were calculated immediately after data
acquisition and could be utilized to verify data
integrity during analysis.

827, 1167, 1910-1911 , 1918, 1923, 3119, 3563,
3586-3587, 626-3627 , 3983, 4027, 4071 , 42784279, 4330-4331, 4731 , 4759 , 4763 , 4955 , 5843 ...

•

•

After the chip-off data extraction, the
extraction team performed a big/ little endian
conversion by reversing the byte order so that
ACSII strings would be human readable. It is
these converted files that were subsequently
analyzed.

7. ANALYSIS AND
RESULTS
Both flash images were examined for PCI DSS
protected data, specifically cardholder and
authentication data. Using the available last
transaction data to seed explicit searches, then
searching the extracted data using regular
expressions based on PCI DSS protected data
and transaction data formats , we found no
protected or transaction data in clear text (such
1

kernel 1 hash:
16521FB7808153E5A52E2994FD78BFF1
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The two flash images were then examined in
a hex editor for strings, similarities, and
differences (image md5 hashes are different 1) to
establish what other information might be
available.

Byte differences at the locations above are
all in the 4th (if one) or 3rd and 4th octets (if
pair) of 4-octet groups; these look like op codes
for a 32-bit processor, and the last byte or last
two bytes of each 4-octet op code is/ are the op
code's arguments (e.g. , memory address,
register, etc.) [5]. Device serial numbers and
kernel versions are near the end of the kernel
block Cbytes 65310-65527). The serial number
is the bold string starting with 212 or 213 , and
the kernel version is the bold string starting
with V.QB.
kernel 1: VX610 US M25654336USDD
00000212-318-169160960790312806411
10/ 02/ 2009 V.QB0111A3 "2.5 .2"
kernel 2: VX610 US M25654336USDG
00000213-696-415161351220312806411
08/ 14/ 2009 V.QB0111A2 "2.5.lA"
The flash file system begins after the kernel,
located at byte offsets 65536-573440 (sector 128kernel 2 hash:
AF3A27BE64838A2FD10B79CE611BE558
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1119). The file system range was identified after
finding the files as described below. Sector 1120
starts with 0xFFs; non-0xFFs are at various
sectors (different in each image, but both start
at sector 1152). To identify files in the images,
file names were identified by first finding the
load list (bytes 129640-12997 5 in these images).
The load list contained the following filenames
and is the same in both images. All files were
found in the flash images except wizard.ram (I:
indicates RAM file system).
B: _ crypto.ram
B:schedulr. bin

CDFSL Proceedings 2019
File contents were found by first searching
for the file name from the load list, then
identifying a common precursor byte string that
indicated the start of a new file. Most but not
all files in the two images used constant
precursor byte strings: kernel 1 used 0x09100214
and kernel 2 used 0x09081411. Files were
identified at the locations noted in Table 1 in
the Appendix. Differences noted in bold red
(file contents were not directly compared);
start/ end/ size are byte offsets in decimal; end
and size are estimated based on the start of the
next file. VLR files are screen messages.

B:clk 3610.bin

More files were found by searching for drive
prefixes (capital letter followed by colon), then
looking for that file name in other locations. For
these files below (a partial list), file data follows
the filename by about 40 bytes:

B: _ upgrade. tmp

certfile.sys

B: _ buf_mgr.bin

modprof.s37

B:iic. bin
B:clk 6900.bin

B:bpr.bin
B:coml .bin
T: info.bin
T:console. bin
U:security.bin
U:pipe_mgr.bin

ASC8X21.VFT
ASC4Xl6.VFT
SPUTIL.VFT
VCS 8Xl6.vft
VCSLOGOS.VFT
VMAC.LIB

V:iccl.bin

cdma.p7s

W:ipp.bin

cdma.out

Y:usb host.bin

Using strings and manual examination of
the remainder of the data in the images (sectors
1120-end) revealed the following potentially
useful but not fully explored items:

Y:cdma usb.bin
Y:usbd.bin
Y:com2 .bin
Y:com3 .bin
Z:mag.bin
Z:printer.bin

Multiple locations in image 1 and 2:
"PREDATOR" (user? also in ped.lib)
Sector 1400 (image 1) and 1322 (image 2):
FTP
user
(anonymous)
and password
(guest@vfi.com);

Z:battery.bin
!:wizard.ram
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Sector 1773 (image 1) and 1695 (image 2):
"Password:" and "66831" (a known default
access code for downloads, time/ date changes,
etc. [7])

evidence of PCI DSS data storage violations
were identified.

Variable "*GO" in configuration file sets the
startup program; both set to F:APLOAD.OUT
(this file was not found on either flash image)

This paper analyzed a single model of POS
system, and the analysis was has only begun.
We intend to more fully explore and analyze the
acquired image files and to analyze additional
POS devices.

Sector 1389 (image 1), 1311 (image 2):
Banshee.Carlos Only.CO561
Only .. Carlos+ CO561 ... .MC56 Only ... MC55
Only ... EM3420 Only.CO710
Only .. Carlos+ MC56.Carlos+ MC55.Carlos+ EM
3420 ... Carlos+ CO710 .... Eisenhower
The rest of the image files contained mostly
compiled code and suspected encrypted data
(based on data entropy); the rest contained
clear text entries of error messages,
informational messages, initialization messages,
menu items, file names and locations,
configuration settings, and device information.

9. FUTURE RESEARCH

Additional analysis will also examine the
Verix v Operating System and code apparently
running on these POS systems.
Lastly, we hope to acquire similar POS
devices and their accompanying payment
system services so we can control the
configuration data and transaction data in order
to trace it through the system and enable more
explicit searches.

8. DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
The analysis results suggest that most of the
data is either binary code or encrypted data,
and the clear text appears to contain only
informational and error messages, configuration
information, and some access information.
IP
information
such
as
network
configuration (DNS, DHCP , IP addresses, etc.)
were in clear text , as was an FTP username and
password, presumably used for non-sensitive
downloads.
The last transaction could be printed, which
indicates it is present in the non-volatile flash
memory.
However, no cardholder or
transactional data was found in clear text in the
extracted flash images, which likely indicates
that transactional and cardholder data that is
retained is also encrypted. Given that no
sensitive authentication data was printed, no
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Appendix 1: File Location in the Kernels
Table 1
File Locations in the K emels

kernel 1
filename

start

end

kernel 2
size

start

end

size

flashmgr.ram

65600

75519

9920

65600

75519

9920

_crypto.ram

75568

79603

4036

75568

79603

4036

schedulr.bin

79652

102399

22748

79652

102399

22748

iic.bin

102448

103727

1280

102448

103727

1280

clk_6900.bin

103776

109223

5448

103776

109223

5448

clk_3610.bin

109272

115511

6240

109272

115511

6240

_upgrade.tmp

115560

123391

7832

115560

123391

7832

_buf_mgr.bin

123440

124871

1432

123440

124871

1432

bpr.bin

124920

125487

568

124920

125487

568

com1_.bin

125536

129591

4056

125536

129591

4056

loadlist.sys

129640

131087

1448

129640

131087

1448

sysmode.out

131136

196623

65488

131136

196623

65488

pedgrdfa.out

196672

202767

6096

196672

202767

6096

ped.lib

202816

226495

23680

202816

226495

23680

_info.bin

226544

230211

3668

226544

230211

3668

console.bin

230260

262159

31900

230260

262159

31900

unzip.out

262208

270375

8168

262208

270375

8168

security.bin

270424

308235

37812

270424

308283

37860

pipe_mgr.bin

308284

327695

19412

308332

327695

19364

smipp.out

327744

332815

5072

327744

332815

5072

smresdl.out

332864

339983

7120

332864

339983

7120

icc_diag.out

340032

356999

16968

340032

356999

16968

icc1.bin

357048

393231

36184

357048

393231

36184

sys.lib

393280

436803

43524

393280

436735

43456

ipp.bin

436852

459855

23004

436784

459855

23072

usb_host.bin

459904

473155

13252

459904

473155

13252

cdma_usb.bin

473204

482215

9012

473204

482215

9012

usbd.bin

482264

491563

9300

482264

491563

9300

com2_.bin

491612

496347

4736

491612

496347

4736
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kernel 1
filename

start

end

kernel 2
size

start

end

size

com3_.bin

496396

524303

27908

496396

524303

27908

timezone.vlr

524352

529651

5300

524352

529651

5300

sm_text.vlr

529700

536195

6496

529700

536195

6496

dlerr.vlr

536244

536595

352

536244

536595

352

dlmsg.vlr

536644

537255

612

536644

537255

612

mag.bin

537304

545211

7908

537304

545211

7908

printer.bin

545260

564907

19648

545260

564907

19648

battery.bin

564956

572927

7972

564956

572927

7972
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Appendix 2: PCI DSS Quick Reference Guide: Protect Cardholder Data (PCI 2018, 14-15)
Cardholder data refers to any information printed, processed, transmitted or stored in any form
on a payment card. Entities accepting payment cards are expected to protect cardholder data and
to prevent its unauthorized use - whether the data is printed or stored locally, or transmitted over
an internal or public network to a remote server or service provider.
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data
Cardholder data should not be stored unless it's necessary to meet the needs of the business.
Sensitive data on the magnetic stripe or chip must never be stored after authorization. If your
organization stores the Primary Account Number (PAN), it is crucial to render it unreadable (see
3.4, and Table 2 for guidelines).
3.1
Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that which is required for business, legal,
and/ or regulatory purposes, as documented in your data retention policy. Purge unnecessary stored
data at least quarterly.
3.2

Do not store sensitive authentication data after authorization (even if it is encrypted). See table
below. Render all sensitive authentication data unrecoverable upon completion of the authorization
process. Issuers and related entities may store sensitive authentication data if there is a business
justification, and the data is stored securely.
3.3
Mask PAN when displayed (the first six and last four digits are the maximum number of digits
you may display) , so that only authorized people with a legitimate business need can see more than
the first six/ last four digits of the PAN. This does not supersede stricter requirements that may be
in place for displays of cardholder data, such as on a point-of-sale receipt.
3.4
Render PAN unreadable anywhere it is stored - including on portable digital media, backup
media, in logs, and data received from or stored by wireless networks. Technology solutions for this
requirement may include strong one-way hash functions of the entire PAN , truncation, index tokens
with securely stored pads, or strong cryptography.
3.5
Document and implement procedures to protect any keys used for encryption of cardholder data
from disclosure and misuse.
3.6

Fully document and implement key management processes and procedures for cryptographic
keys used for encryption of cardholder data.
3.7

Ensure that related security policies and operational procedures are documented, in use, and
known to all affected parties.
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Table 2:
Guidelines for Cardholder Data Elements (PCI 2018, p15}

Cardhol!d er
Data

Sensltilve
Aulhentlcatlon
Data 1

1
2
3

4

Data Element

Storage Perm ltted

Render Stored Data
Unreadable per
Requlreme:nt 3A

Pr"mary Account
Number (PAN),

Yes

Yes

Cardho der Name

Yes

No

Service Code

Yes

No

Expi ratiion Dat e

Yes

No

FulllTrack Data 2

No

Cannot store p er
Requirement 3.2

CAV2/C)IC2/CI./V2/CID3

No

Cannot store p er
Requirement 3.2

PIN/IPIN IBl!ock'

No

Cannot store p er
Requirement 3.2

1

Senf ive au.tllentic.atim1 data,must not be stored after authorization ,(even, if enorypted)
Fi1.1II trad: data fmm the m.1gnetic .str(pe. eqµival'.ent data,mi the chip. m elsewhere.
The three- or fom-<ilgit value [Printed on tlle front m baok of a payment card
Personal lde11tifa:ar on Number entered bv cardho d:er dml11g a trans:actio11, and/or enorypted PIN blook: present-within the
transaction message
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